Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.05.009zbMATH Open1309.91097OpenAlexW2087667018MaRDI QIDQ406378FDOQ406378

Authors: Roger B. Myerson 

Publication date: 8 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.009

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcredit cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Credit risk (91G40) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cited In (7)

• Revisiting the model of credit cycles with good and bad projects
• Credit markets with moral hazard and heterogeneous valuations of collateral
• Volatile capital flows and financial integration: the role of moral hazard
• Financial destabilization
• Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
• Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets
• Credit Markets with Ethical Banks and Motivated Borrowers

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