scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1269585
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Publication:4236385
The difference between logical and subjective probabilities are explained. The author presents two criticism of Bayesianism. He develops a general non-Bayesian account of confirmation, designed to be used when Bayesianism is not applicable. An application to machine learning is given. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0908.90001].
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