A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior

DOI10.1111/1467-9442.00081zbMATH Open0949.91512OpenAlexW2156472465MaRDI QIDQ4256249FDOQ4256249

Authors: David Martimort 

Publication date: 28 November 2000

Published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00081

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cited In (3)

• Vertical relationships with hidden interactions
• Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design
• Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility

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