Defeating the gang: The social dynamics of compliance in a rake‐off economy*

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1997.9990203MaRDI QIDQ4384963zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Pier Luigi Sacco

Publication date 13 April 1998

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social dynamicsinertial behavioreconomy of retailersorganized crimesocial conventionsState support policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

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Cited in

(3)

• The Political Economy of Moral Conflict: An Empirical Study of Learning and Law Enforcement Under Prohibition
• The emergence of deontological codes in public administration
• Criminal dilemmas. Understanding and preventing crime

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