OPTIMAL PAYOFF FUNCTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF COLLECTIVES

DOI10.1142/S0219525901000188zbMath1058.91025OpenAlexW2161061197MaRDI QIDQ4425265

Kagan Tumer, David H. Wolpert

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Advances in Complex Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219525901000188

zbMATH Keywords

Distributed controlteam gamecollective intelligencearistocrat utilityEl Farol Bar problemwonderful life utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (8)

Environment-driven distributed evolutionary adaptation in a population of autonomous robotic agents ⋮ A MULTIAGENT COORDINATION APPROACH TO ROBUST CONSENSUS CLUSTERING ⋮ A neuro-evolutionary approach to control surface segmentation for micro aerial vehicles ⋮ REINFORCEMENT LEARNING IN MARKOVIAN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ⋮ LEARNING FROM ACTIONS NOT TAKEN IN MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS ⋮ MULTIAGENT LEARNING FOR BLACK BOX SYSTEM REWARD FUNCTIONS ⋮ LEARNING INDIRECT ACTIONS IN COMPLEX DOMAINS: ACTION SUGGESTIONS FOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ⋮ ADVANCES IN DISTRIBUTED OPTIMIZATION USING PROBABILITY COLLECTIVES

Cites Work

• Potential games

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