Incentives versus insurance in the design of tax-financed unemployment insurance
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Recommendations
- Unemployment Insurance and the Entitlement Effect: A Tax Incidence Approach
- Redistributive unemployment benefit and taxation
- Effort, taxation and unemployment
- Optimal welfare and in-work benefits with search unemployment and observable abilities
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Cited in
(17)- Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance
- The hiring subsidy cum firing tax in a search model of unemployment.
- Explicit versus implicit income insurance
- Funding employer-based insurance: regressive taxation and premium exclusions
- Vouchers as a way to finance unemployment benefits
- Optimal automatic stabilizers
- Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
- Efficient unemployment insurance and the cost of borrowing
- Optimal welfare and in-work benefits with search unemployment and observable abilities
- Redistributive unemployment benefit and taxation
- Unemployment volatility: when workers pay costs upon accepting jobs
- An analysis of non-insurance work incentives
- Erratum: An analysis of non-insurance work incentives
- Welfare states and unemployment
- A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
- Unemployment Insurance and the Entitlement Effect: A Tax Incidence Approach
- Unemployment insurance and moral hazard in employment
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