Unemployment insurance and moral hazard in employment

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(95)00673-4MaRDI QIDQ672576zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors L. N. Christofides, C. J. McKenna

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00673-4

zbMATH Keywords

Job durationMoral hazardUnemployment insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Partial likelihood

Cited in

(10)

• Unemployment Insurance Rules, Joblessness, and Part-Time Work
• Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
• A Menu of Insurance Contracts for the Unemployed
• Unemployment insurance, unemployment durations and re-employment wages
• Unemployment Insurance and the Entitlement Effect: A Tax Incidence Approach
• A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
• From dual to unified employment protection: Transition and steady state
• Employment and wages with sector-specific shocks and worker moral hazard
• Unequal use of social insurance benefits: the role of employers
• Should unemployment insurance vary with the unemployment rate? Theory and evidence

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