Collateral in banking policy: on the possibility of signaling

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.06.002zbMATH Open1308.91112OpenAlexW1994012355MaRDI QIDQ459178FDOQ459178

Authors: Volker Bieta, Udo Broll, Wilfried Siebe 

Publication date: 8 October 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.06.002

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• Signaling in Credit Markets
• Optimal monetary policy in a collateralized economy
• Collateral amplification under complete markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Microeconomic theory
• Games and information. An introduction to game theory.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Utility functions of equivalent form and the effect of parameter changes on optimum decision making
• Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information
• Signaling in Credit Markets
• Hedging mean-reverting commodities

Cited In (10)

• Hands in the cookie jar: exploiting loan loss provisions under bank financial distress
• Collateral and reputation in a model of strategic defaults
• Deposit Collateral and the Role of Banks *
• A Theory of Collateral for the Lender of Last Resort*
• Financial maintenance covenants in bank loans
• Closure Policy when Bank Inspection Can Be Manipulated *
• Rothschild/Stiglitz dominance and (in)compatibility of collateral in the presence of ex ante hidden information
• Collateral and bank screening as complements: a spillover effect
• Leverage dynamics and credit quality
• Collateral misrepresentation, external auditing, and optimal supervisory policy

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