How can a retailer identify the dominant strategy in a newsvendor situation with a supplier take-it-or-leave-it offer?

DOI10.1111/ITOR.12254MaRDI QIDQ4601635zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Youkyung Won

Publication date 24 January 2018

Published in International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12254

zbMATH Keywords

newsvendor problemdominant strategytake-it-or-leave-it offer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

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Cited in

(4)

• Impact of power structure on supply chain performance and consumer surplus
• Supplier's strategy: align with the dominant entrant retailer or the vulnerable incumbent retailer?
• Is group‐buying price mechanism a good choice in the business‐to‐business system?
• Dominance relationship among the retailer's strategies under the semi-Stackelberg newsvendor situation with quantity discounts

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