Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services
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Publication:462340
DOI10.1016/J.AUTOMATICA.2013.12.020zbMATH Open1298.93356OpenAlexW2118110649MaRDI QIDQ462340FDOQ462340
Authors: Parijat Dube, Rahul Jain 
Publication date: 20 October 2014
Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2013.12.020
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Cited In (10)
- Pricing differentiated services: a game-theoretic approach
- On understanding price-QoS war for competitive market and confused consumers
- On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition
- Network QoS games: stability vs optimality tradeoff
- Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
- Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategic arrivals into queueing networks: the network concert queueing game
- Congestion control for a system with parallel stations and homogeneous customers using priority passes
- A duopoly model with heterogeneous congestion-sensitive customers
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