Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services

DOI10.1016/j.automatica.2013.12.020zbMath1298.93356MaRDI QIDQ462340

Parijat Dube, Rahul Jain

Publication date: 20 October 2014

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2013.12.020

zbMATH Keywords

differentiated services; price of anarchy; Bertrand competition; queueing games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

90B22: Queues and service in operations research

93E20: Optimal stochastic control

91A60: Probabilistic games; gambling

Related Items

Congestion control for a system with parallel stations and homogeneous customers using priority passes, Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers, Strategic Arrivals into Queueing Networks: The Network Concert Queueing Game

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