Representing strategic games and their equilibria in many-valued logics
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Publication:4644540
DOI10.1093/JIGPAL/JZW004zbMATH Open1405.03058arXiv1601.00408OpenAlexW2964135467MaRDI QIDQ4644540FDOQ4644540
Authors: Libor Běhounek, Chris Fermüller, Tomáš Kroupa, Petr Cintula 
Publication date: 8 January 2019
Published in: Logic Journal of the IGPL (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We introduce the notion of logical A-games for a fairly general class of algebras A of real truth-values. This concept generalizes the Boolean games of Harrenstein et al. as well as the recently defined Lukasiewicz games of Marchioni and Wooldridge. We demonstrate that a wide range of strategic n-player games can be represented as logical A-games. Moreover we show how to construct, under rather general conditions, propositional formulas in the language of A that correspond to pure and mixed Nash equilibria of logical A-games.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.00408
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