A game theoretical analysis of the quantity discount problem with perfect and incomplete information about the buyer's cost structure
DOI10.1051/RO/1995290404151zbMATH Open0848.90045OpenAlexW2495781153MaRDI QIDQ4882989FDOQ4882989
Authors: M. Parlar, Qinan Wang 
Publication date: 13 October 1996
Published in: RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eudml.org/doc/105116
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Stackelberg equilibriumtwo-person nonzero-sum gameinformational structurequantity discount problemseller's optimal quantity discount schedule
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
Cited In (7)
- Construction and analysis of contract feasible set under quantity‐discount contract
- Single-vendor multi-buyer inventory coordination under private information
- Determination of suppliers' optimal quantity discount schedules with heterogeneous buyers
- A Cooperative Game Theory Model of Quantity Discounts
- The role of quantity discounts in the presence of heterogeneous buyers
- Supplier pricing and lot sizing when demand is price sensitive
- On coordination of supply chain based on information asymmetry of effort level and fuzzy market environment
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