Restall and Beall on logical pluralism: a critique

DOI10.1007/S10670-013-9478-8zbMATH Open1304.03014OpenAlexW2084091360MaRDI QIDQ488376FDOQ488376

Authors: Manuel Bremer 

Publication date: 26 January 2015

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9478-8

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cites Work

• Logical pluralism
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (7)

• Contra Cartwright: Structural realism, ontological pluralism and fundamentalism about laws
• Pluralistic perspectives on logic: an introduction
• Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism
• What logical pluralism cannot be
• Meaning-preserving translations of non-classical logics into classical logic: between pluralism and monism
• Restall's proof-theoretic pluralism and relevance logic
• Problems for logical pluralism

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