Signalling Reversal

DOI10.2307/2527332MaRDI QIDQ4889520zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ram Orzach, Yair Tauman

Publication date 12 August 1996

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527332

zbMATH Keywords

signallingseparating equilibriumstrong contestant

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
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Cited in

(7)

• Insolubility from no-signalling
• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
• Competition and confidentiality: signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information
• Signals for reliability: A possibly harmful institution?
• Runaway signals: exaggerated displays of commitment may result from second-order signaling
• Strategic dropouts
• Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly

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