scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1453157

MaRDI QIDQ4955439zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Robert Stalnaker

Publication date 2 April 2001

zbMATH Keywords

model theorynoncooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of model theory (03C98) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Review text

The main aim of this paper is to promote a general framework for the evolution of solution concepts in the game theory, a framework that is borrowed from the model theory for modal and epistemic logic. One starts by developing an analogy between the evaluation of a logic and the evaluation of a solution concept. The concept of a model must represent the relevant features of game situations and illustrate the way in which the framework can be used to justify and clarify a solution concept. The paper is structured as follows: (1) Introduction; (2) Formal semantics: an analogy; (3) Models for games; (4) Rationalizability; (5) Nash equilibrium; (6) Strong rationalizability; (7) Refining the models: belief revision; (8) Invariance. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0931.00027].

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Cited in

(4)

• On the evaluation of solution concepts
• Counterfactuals
• Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations
• The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications

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