Formal analysis of the information leakage of the DC-nets and crowds anonymity protocols

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-70848-5_10zbMATH Open1498.68047OpenAlexW2767986153MaRDI QIDQ5045463FDOQ5045463

Authors: Arthur Américo, Artur Vaz, Mário S. Alvim, Sérgio Campos, Annabelle McIver 

Publication date: 4 November 2022

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70848-5_10

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zbMATH Keywords

model checkingformal methodsquantitative information flowcrowdsdining cryptographers\(g\)-leakage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.) (68Q60) Channel models (including quantum) in information and communication theory (94A40) Computer security (68M25)

Cited In (5)

• Quantifying information leakage of randomized protocols
• Evaluation of anonymity and confidentiality protocols using theorem proving
• An algebraic approach for reasoning about information flow
• Knowledge transfer and information leakage in protocols
• Quantifying information leakage of randomized protocols

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