Formal analysis of the information leakage of the DC-nets and crowds anonymity protocols

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-70848-5_10MaRDI QIDQ5045463zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arthur Américo, Artur Vaz, Mário S. Alvim, Sérgio Campos, Annabelle McIver

Publication date 4 November 2022

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70848-5_10

zbMATH Keywords

model checkingformal methodsquantitative information flowcrowdsdining cryptographers\(g\)-leakage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.) (68Q60) Channel models (including quantum) in information and communication theory (94A40) Computer security (68M25)

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(5)

• Knowledge transfer and information leakage in protocols
• Evaluation of anonymity and confidentiality protocols using theorem proving
• An algebraic approach for reasoning about information flow
• Quantifying information leakage of randomized protocols
• Quantifying information leakage of randomized protocols

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