Incomplete‐information games in large populations with anonymity

DOI10.3982/TE4066zbMATH Open1489.91047OpenAlexW4210808284MaRDI QIDQ5087352FDOQ5087352

Authors: Martin Hellwig 

Publication date: 11 July 2022

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4066

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zbMATH Keywords

exchangeabilityconditional independencebelief functionsconditional exact law of large numberslarge populationscommon priorsincomplete-information games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cited In (3)

• Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution
• Large strategic dynamic interactions
• Robust perfect equilibrium in large games

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