Incomplete‐information games in large populations with anonymity

DOI10.3982/TE4066MaRDI QIDQ5087352zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Hellwig

Publication date 11 July 2022

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4066

zbMATH Keywords

belief functionscommon priorsconditional exact law of large numbersconditional independenceexchangeabilityincomplete-information gameslarge populations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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Cited in

(7)

• Large strategic dynamic interactions
• Robust perfect equilibrium in large games
• Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution
• Continuous time random matching
• Equilibrium convergence in large games
• Localized perfection
• The equilibrium properties of direct strategy profiles in games with many players

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