A Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium in a pollution reduction scheme
DOI10.1142/S0219198921500146zbMATH Open1497.91180OpenAlexW3169333136MaRDI QIDQ5094545FDOQ5094545
Authors: Ryle S. Perera 
Publication date: 3 August 2022
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500146
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Cites Work
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- Engineering and Economic Applications of Complementarity Problems
- Implicit smoothing and its application to optimization with piecewise smooth equality constraints
- A lower bound for the first passage time density of the suprathreshold Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
- Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations
- A Stochastic Version of a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Model
- An MPCC approach for stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot equilibrium
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- A cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
- Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
- Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution
Cited In (5)
- Stochastic Switching Games and Duopolistic Competition in Emissions Markets
- Nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems
- Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
- Optimal accumulation of pollution: Existence of limit cycles for the social optimum and the competitive equilibrium
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