A Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium in a pollution reduction scheme
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5094545
stochastic gameenvironmental regulationStackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibriumambient chargehybrid pollution abatement technology
Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Recommendations
- A Stochastic Version of a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Model
- Leader-follower equilibria for electric power and \(\text{NO}_x\) allowances markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2099041
- A stochastic multiple-leader Stackelberg model: analysis, computation, and application
- Stochastic Switching Games and Duopolistic Competition in Emissions Markets
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424524 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Stochastic Version of a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Model
- A cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
- A lower bound for the first passage time density of the suprathreshold Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
- An MPCC approach for stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot equilibrium
- Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
- Engineering and Economic Applications of Complementarity Problems
- Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution
- Implicit smoothing and its application to optimization with piecewise smooth equality constraints
- Optimization and nonsmooth analysis
- Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations
Cited in
(5)- Stochastic Switching Games and Duopolistic Competition in Emissions Markets
- Nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems
- Optimal accumulation of pollution: Existence of limit cycles for the social optimum and the competitive equilibrium
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
- Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures
This page was built for publication: A Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium in a pollution reduction scheme
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5094545)
