Generic side-channel distinguishers: improvements and limitations

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_20zbMATH Open1287.94102DBLPconf/crypto/Veyrat-CharvillonS11OpenAlexW2248552015WikidataQ58765136 ScholiaQ58765136MaRDI QIDQ5199201FDOQ5199201

Authors: Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon, François-Xavier Standaert 

Publication date: 12 August 2011

Published in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2011 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_20

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60)

Cited In (10)

• Good is not good enough. Deriving optimal distinguishers from communication theory
• Masking tables -- an underestimated security risk
• A key to success. Success exponents for side-channel distinguishers
• On hardening leakage resilience of random extractors for instantiations of leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives
• Generic Side-Channel Countermeasures for Reconfigurable Devices
• Side Channel Attacks on Irregularly Decimated Generators
• How to characterize side-channel leakages more accurately?
• A formal study of power variability issues and side-channel attacks for nanoscale devices
• Robust profiling for DPA-style attacks
• A theoretical study of Kolmogorov-Smirnov distinguishers

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