Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.118zbMATH Open1433.91071OpenAlexW2949526631MaRDI QIDQ5236304FDOQ5236304

Bruno Ziliotto, José R. Correa, Raimundo Saona

Publication date: 15 October 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.118

zbMATH Keywords

optimal stoppingprophet secretary problemblind quantile strategiesposted price mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cited In (11)

• Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms
• Prophet secretary for \(k\)-knapsack and \(l\)-matroid intersection via continuous exchange property
• Prophet Inequalities for Independent and Identically Distributed Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution
• Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms
• Blind Reconciliation
• The secretary problem with distributions
• Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids
• Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: the role of loss aversion and changing reference points
• Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms
• Prophet inequalities vs. approximating optimum online
• Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals

This page was built for publication: Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5236304)