Prophet secretary through blind strategies
DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.118zbMATH Open1433.91071OpenAlexW2949526631MaRDI QIDQ5236304FDOQ5236304
Authors: José R. Correa, Raimundo Saona, Bruno Ziliotto 
Publication date: 15 October 2019
Published in: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.118
Recommendations
Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)
Cited In (20)
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- Tight revenue gaps among multiunit mechanisms
- Prophet secretary
- Optimal prophet inequality with less than one sample
- Sample-Driven Optimal Stopping: From the Secretary Problem to the i.i.d. Prophet Inequality
- Prophet secretary for \(k\)-knapsack and \(l\)-matroid intersection via continuous exchange property
- Prophet secretary through blind strategies
- Blind Reconciliation
- Posted price mechanisms and optimal threshold strategies for random arrivals
- Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
- Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary Problem
- The secretary problem with distributions
- Prophet inequality with competing agents
- Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids
- Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: the role of loss aversion and changing reference points
- Prophet inequalities for independent and identically distributed random variables from an unknown distribution
- Improved revenue bounds for posted-price and second-price mechanisms
- Beating \(1-\frac{1}{e}\) for ordered prophets
- Prophet inequalities vs. approximating optimum online
- Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids
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