Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies
DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.118zbMATH Open1433.91071OpenAlexW2949526631MaRDI QIDQ5236304FDOQ5236304
Bruno Ziliotto, José R. Correa, Raimundo Saona
Publication date: 15 October 2019
Published in: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.118
Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)
Cited In (11)
- Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms
- Prophet secretary for \(k\)-knapsack and \(l\)-matroid intersection via continuous exchange property
- Prophet Inequalities for Independent and Identically Distributed Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution
- Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms
- Blind Reconciliation
- The secretary problem with distributions
- Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids
- Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: the role of loss aversion and changing reference points
- Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms
- Prophet inequalities vs. approximating optimum online
- Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals
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