Prophet secretary through blind strategies

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.118MaRDI QIDQ5236304zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors José R. Correa, Raimundo Saona, Bruno Ziliotto

Publication date 15 October 2019

Published in Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.118

zbMATH Keywords

optimal stoppingprophet secretary problemblind quantile strategiesposted price mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

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Cited in

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• Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids
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• Tight revenue gaps among multiunit mechanisms
• Prophet secretary for \(k\)-knapsack and \(l\)-matroid intersection via continuous exchange property
• Optimal prophet inequality with less than one sample
• Sample-Driven Optimal Stopping: From the Secretary Problem to the i.i.d. Prophet Inequality
• Prophet secretary through blind strategies
• Blind Reconciliation
• Posted price mechanisms and optimal threshold strategies for random arrivals
• Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
• Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary Problem
• The secretary problem with distributions
• Prophet inequality with competing agents
• Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids
• Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: the role of loss aversion and changing reference points
• Prophet inequalities for independent and identically distributed random variables from an unknown distribution
• Improved revenue bounds for posted-price and second-price mechanisms
• Beating \(1-\frac{1}{e}\) for ordered prophets
• Prophet inequalities vs. approximating optimum online

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