Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.118zbMath1433.91071OpenAlexW2949526631MaRDI QIDQ5236304

Bruno Ziliotto, José R. Correa, Raimundo Saona

Publication date: 15 October 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.118

zbMATH Keywords

optimal stoppingprophet secretary problemblind quantile strategiesposted price mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (9)

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms ⋮ Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms ⋮ The secretary problem with distributions ⋮ Prophet Inequalities for Independent and Identically Distributed Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution ⋮ Optimal stopping with behaviorally biased agents: the role of loss aversion and changing reference points ⋮ Prophet inequalities vs. approximating optimum online ⋮ Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms ⋮ Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals ⋮ Prophet secretary for \(k\)-knapsack and \(l\)-matroid intersection via continuous exchange property

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