Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms

DOI10.1287/opre.2021.2121zbMath1484.91207arXiv1807.03435OpenAlexW3205978357MaRDI QIDQ5031662

Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Negin Golrezaei, Martin Pál, Balasubramanian Sivan, Renato Paes Leme

Publication date: 16 February 2022

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.03435

zbMATH Keywords

position auctiononline advertisingposted-price mechanismseager second-price auctionsmultiunit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (1)

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms

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