Quantum authentication with key recycling

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Publication:5270367

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-56617-7_12zbMATH Open1415.94470arXiv1610.03422OpenAlexW2530225612MaRDI QIDQ5270367FDOQ5270367


Authors: Christopher Portmann Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 23 June 2017

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We show that a family of quantum authentication protocols introduced in [Barnum et al., FOCS 2002] can be used to construct a secure quantum channel and additionally recycle all of the secret key if the message is successfully authenticated, and recycle part of the key if tampering is detected. We give a full security proof that constructs the secure channel given only insecure noisy channels and a shared secret key. We also prove that the number of recycled key bits is optimal for this family of protocols, i.e., there exists an adversarial strategy to obtain all non-recycled bits. Previous works recycled less key and only gave partial security proofs, since they did not consider all possible distinguishers (environments) that may be used to distinguish the real setting from the ideal secure quantum channel and secret key resource.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.03422




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