False-name-proof combinatorial auction design via single-minded decomposition

zbMATH Open1366.91096MaRDI QIDQ5283055FDOQ5283055

Authors: Dengji Zhao, Siqi Luo, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo 

Publication date: 18 July 2017

Full work available at URL: http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/37064

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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