Divisible goods auction model and a method for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity
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Publication:5318642
Recommendations
- Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation
- MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS
- Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits
- Study of group decision method in allocation of pollutant discharge total
- Equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits
Cited in
(5)- Equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits
- Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits
- Study of group decision method in allocation of pollutant discharge total
- LP models for pricing diffuse nitrate discharge permits
- Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation
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