Equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits

DOI10.1016/0095-0696(86)90032-XMaRDI QIDQ1078053zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Randolph M. Lyon

Publication date 1986

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(86)90032-X

zbMATH Keywords

competitive marketenvironmental managementequilibrium propertiesfair divisionNash equilibriumpublic allocation proceduresrange of auctionstransferable permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(5)

• A study to zero-out auctions: Testbed experiments of a process of allocating private rights to the use of public property
• On the long-run efficiency of auctioned vs. free permits
• Consignment auctions revisited
• OPTIMAL TIMING AND EQUILIBRIUM PRICE FOR SOE PROPERTY RIGHTS TRANSFER UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
• Divisible goods auction model and a method for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity

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