An auction-bargaining model for initial emission permits

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-07956-1_30MaRDI QIDQ5251657zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lili Ding, Wanglin Kang, Xiaoling Wang

Publication date 20 May 2015

Published in Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07956-1_30

zbMATH Keywords

auction-bargainingemission permitsequilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions
• Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits
• A minimax model and arithmetic for initial emission permits
• Consignment auctions revisited
• Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?

Cited in

(10)

• Equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits
• On the long-run efficiency of auctioned vs. free permits
• A Pareto optimal auction mechanism for carbon emission rights
• Consignment auctions revisited
• Auction design for the allocation of carbon emission allowances to supply chains via multi-agent-based model and Q-learning
• Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits
• Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?
• Influence of agent-based bidding learning on carbon emission rights auction
• Sellers' hedging incentives at EPA's emission trading auction
• A minimax model and arithmetic for initial emission permits

This page was built for publication: An auction-bargaining model for initial emission permits

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5251657)