Reapproaching Ramsey: conditionals and iterated belief change in the spirit of AGM
DOI10.1007/S10992-011-9177-3zbMATH Open1233.03015OpenAlexW2062015890MaRDI QIDQ535330FDOQ535330
Authors: Hans Rott
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9177-3
Recommendations
Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27)
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Cited In (15)
- Defeasible normative reasoning
- Iterated descriptor revision and the logic of Ramsey test conditionals
- DIFFERENCE-MAKING CONDITIONALS AND THE RELEVANT RAMSEY TEST
- The irreducibility of iterated to single revision
- Lewis' triviality for quasi probabilities
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- AN EXPRESSIVIST ANALYSIS OF THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL WITH A RESTRICTOR SEMANTICS
- On the Ramsey test analysis of `because'
- Four ways in which theories of belief revision could benefit from theories of epistemic justification
- A concept for the evolution of relational probabilistic belief states and the computation of their changes under optimum entropy semantics
- Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the Ramsey test
- Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision
- A reason maintenance perspective on relevant Ramsey conditionals
- A simple and non-trivial Ramsey test
- Difference-making conditionals and connexivity
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