Expected utility in Savage's framework without the completeness axiom

DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01464-yzbMath1522.91120OpenAlexW4306766608MaRDI QIDQ6074835

Dino Borie

Publication date: 19 September 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01464-y

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete preferencessubjective expected utilitymultiple beliefsmultiple tastes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08)

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