Expected utility in Savage's framework without the completeness axiom
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Publication:6074835
DOI10.1007/S00199-022-01464-YzbMATH Open1522.91120OpenAlexW4306766608MaRDI QIDQ6074835FDOQ6074835
Authors: Dino Borie 
Publication date: 19 September 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01464-y
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Cites Work
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- Incomplete preferences, willingness to pay, and willingness to accept
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- Multiple tastes and beliefs with an infinite prize space
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