Expected utility in Savage's framework without the completeness axiom
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Publication:6074835
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Definition of Subjective Probability
- A representation of partially ordered preferences
- Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambiguity
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- Incomplete preferences, willingness to pay, and willingness to accept
- Independence, additivity, uncertainty. With contributions by Birgit Grodal
- Knightian decision theory. I.
- Multiple tastes and beliefs with an infinite prize space
- On the representation of incomplete preferences under uncertainty with indecisiveness in tastes and beliefs
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
- Subjective expected utility with incomplete preferences
- The shape of incomplete preferences
- Updating variational (Bewley) preferences
- Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
- Variational Bewley preferences
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