The core of a transferable utility game as the solution to a public good market demand problem

DOI10.1007/s10107-021-01729-9OpenAlexW3212910662MaRDI QIDQ6120897

John A. Weymark, Paul H. Edelman, Martin Van der Linden

Publication date: 21 February 2024

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01729-9

zbMATH Keywords

coreTU gamespublic goodsmarket demandsuperdifferentials

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets
• Cores of cooperative games, superdifferentials of functions, and the Minkowski difference of sets
• Cores of convex games
• Cooperative Fuzzy Games
• Discrete Convex Analysis
• Product-Mix Auctions and Tropical Geometry
• Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities
• Convex Analysis
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• Discrete convexity and equilibria in economies with indivisible goods and money
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