Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.01.012zbMATH Open1203.91190OpenAlexW2162279941MaRDI QIDQ617667FDOQ617667

Authors: Borys Grochulski, Narayana R. Kocherlakota 

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13362.pdf

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• Social welfare and profit maximization from revealed preferences

zbMATH Keywords

nonseparable preferencesprivate skill shocksretrospecitive taxationsocial security systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation
• Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation
• Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation

Cited In (6)

• Optimal social security in a dynastic model with investment externalities and endogenous fertility
• Pay-as-you-go Social Security and the Distribution of Altruistic Transfers
• Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Social Security
• Markovian Social Security in Unequal Societies
• Time-inconsistent preferences and social security: revisited in continuous time
• On the redistributive power of pensions

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