Dynamic strategic interaction between an innovating and a non-innovating incumbent
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Publication:627770
DOI10.1007/S10100-010-0173-4zbMATH Open1206.91050OpenAlexW2108487852MaRDI QIDQ627770FDOQ627770
Authors: Herbert Dawid, Michael Kopel, Peter M. Kort 
Publication date: 3 March 2011
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-010-0173-4
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Cites Work
- Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly
- Dynamic R\&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- New product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents: effects of size on strategy
- Differential game models in management science
- Dynamic model of R\&D, spillovers, and efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
Cited In (12)
- The dynamics of innovation and horizontal differentiation
- Strategic choice between process and product innovation under different competitive regimes
- Trash it or sell it? A strategic analysis of the market introduction of product innovations
- Two state capital accumulation with heterogeneous products: disruptive vs. non-disruptive goods
- Anticipation in innovative investment under oligopolistic competition
- Editorial: ``In Honor of Gustav Feichtinger
- Product innovation with partial capacity rollover
- Delaying product introduction in a duopoly: a strategic dynamic analysis
- INNOVATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN A DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY
- New product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents: effects of size on strategy
- Numerical analysis of Markov-perfect equilibria with multiple stable steady states: a duopoly application with innovative firms
- Loyal customer bases as innovation disincentives for duopolistic firms using strategic signaling and Bayesian analysis
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