Dynamic strategic interaction between an innovating and a non-innovating incumbent

DOI10.1007/S10100-010-0173-4zbMATH Open1206.91050OpenAlexW2108487852MaRDI QIDQ627770FDOQ627770

Herbert Dawid, Michael Kopel, Peter M. Kort

Publication date: 3 March 2011

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-010-0173-4

zbMATH Keywords

differential gameproduct innovationcapacity dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly
• Dynamic R\&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation
• New product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents: effects of size on strategy
• Differential game models in management science
• Dynamic model of R\&D, spillovers, and efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria

Cited In (4)

• Editorial: ``In Honor of Gustav Feichtinger
• Product innovation with partial capacity rollover
• New product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents: effects of size on strategy
• Numerical analysis of Markov-perfect equilibria with multiple stable steady states: a duopoly application with innovative firms

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