Dynamic strategic interaction between an innovating and a non-innovating incumbent
From MaRDI portal
Publication:627770
DOI10.1007/S10100-010-0173-4zbMATH Open1206.91050OpenAlexW2108487852MaRDI QIDQ627770FDOQ627770
Herbert Dawid, Michael Kopel, Peter M. Kort
Publication date: 3 March 2011
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-010-0173-4
Cites Work
- Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly
- Dynamic R\&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- New product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents: effects of size on strategy
- Differential game models in management science
- Dynamic model of R\&D, spillovers, and efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
Cited In (5)
- Editorial: ``In Honor of Gustav Feichtinger
- Product innovation with partial capacity rollover
- INNOVATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN A DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY
- New product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents: effects of size on strategy
- Numerical analysis of Markov-perfect equilibria with multiple stable steady states: a duopoly application with innovative firms
Recommendations
- New product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents: effects of size on strategy 👍 👎
- Anticipation in innovative investment under oligopolistic competition 👍 👎
- INNOVATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN A DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY 👍 👎
- A feedback nash equilibrium solution for non–cooperative innovations in a stochastic differential game framework 👍 👎
- A differential game approach to investment in product differentiation 👍 👎
This page was built for publication: Dynamic strategic interaction between an innovating and a non-innovating incumbent
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q627770)
