Loyal customer bases as innovation disincentives for duopolistic firms using strategic signaling and Bayesian analysis

DOI10.1007/s10479-016-2114-7zbMath1406.91247OpenAlexW2253181232MaRDI QIDQ512964

Francisco J. Santos-Arteaga, Debora Di Caprio, Madjid Tavana

Publication date: 3 March 2017

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2114-7

zbMATH Keywords

customer loyaltymulti-attribute sequential searchproduct introductionstrategic signalingtechnological evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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