The impact of available information on negotiation results
DOI10.1007/S10472-011-9234-1zbMATH Open1237.91106OpenAlexW2094209173MaRDI QIDQ645079FDOQ645079
Authors: Rina Azoulay-Schwartz, Daphna Dor-Shiffer 
Publication date: 8 November 2011
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-011-9234-1
Recommendations
- Bargaining with incomplete information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966914
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2088172
- Negotiating with bounded rational agents in environments with incomplete information using an automated agent
- To reveal or not to reveal? Strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games of timing (91A55) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
- A Mathematical Theory of Communication
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty
- Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
- Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
- Negotiating with bounded rational agents in environments with incomplete information using an automated agent
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
- Strategic Delay in Bargaining
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (4)
This page was built for publication: The impact of available information on negotiation results
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q645079)
