Intrapersonal price discrimination and welfare in a dominant firm model

DOI10.1007/S00712-023-00847-6MaRDI QIDQ6546969zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Manel Antelo, Lluis Bru

Publication date 30 May 2024

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00712-023-00847-6

zbMATH Keywords

competitive fringedominant firmlinear and nonlinear contractsprice discriminationwelfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• How applicable is the dominant firm model of price leadership?
• Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm
• Recent developments in the economics of price discrimination

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