An extensive study of security games with strategic informants

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2024.104162MaRDI QIDQ6592987zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Weiran Shen, Minbiao Han, Weizhe Chen, Taoan Huang, Rohit Singh, Haifeng Xu, Fei Fang

Publication date 26 August 2024

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ARTINT.2024.104162

zbMATH Keywords

community engagementinformantsecurity gameStackelberg game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Mean field games (aspects of game theory) (91A16) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cites work

• External conversions of player strategy in an evolutionary game: A cost-benefit analysis through optimal control
• Optimal Auction Design

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