Which `intensional paradoxes' are paradoxes?

DOI10.1007/S10992-024-09761-8MaRDI QIDQ6606835FDOQ6606835

Authors: Neil Tennant 

Publication date: 17 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

normal formsquantified propositional logicRussell's paradox of propositionsconstructive \textit{reductio}prior's intensional paradoxesproof-theoretic criterion of paradoxicality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical logic and foundations (03-XX)

Cites Work

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• Harmony and paradox. Intensional aspects of proof-theoretic semantics
• Frege's class theory and the logic of sets

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