Altruistic preferences in global emission games

DOI10.1007/S10100-023-00890-0MaRDI QIDQ6608518FDOQ6608518

Authors: Asunción Zapata, A. Mármol, L. Monroy, M. Ángeles Caraballo 

Publication date: 20 September 2024

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

equilibriapartial informationaltruistic preferencesvector-valued gamesnon-cooperative emission games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences
• Sequential incorporation of imprecise information in multiple criteria decision processes
• Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly
• When your gain is also my gain. A class of strategic models with other-regarding agents
• Social and environmental preferences: measuring how people make tradeoffs among themselves, others, and collective goods

Cited In (1)

• Farmer's Game: a game theoretic approach towards burning of crop residue

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