Altruistic preferences in global emission games

DOI10.1007/S10100-023-00890-0MaRDI QIDQ6608518zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Asunción Zapata, A. Mármol, L. Monroy, M. Ángeles Caraballo

Publication date 20 September 2024

Published in CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriapartial informationaltruistic preferencesvector-valued gamesnon-cooperative emission games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

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Cites work

• Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences
• Non-cooperative games
• Sequential incorporation of imprecise information in multiple criteria decision processes
• Social and environmental preferences: measuring how people make tradeoffs among themselves, others, and collective goods
• When your gain is also my gain. A class of strategic models with other-regarding agents

Cited in

(1)

• Farmer's Game: a game theoretic approach towards burning of crop residue

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