Symmetric and dual PRFs from standard assumptions: a generic validation of a prevailing assumption
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6617632
DOI10.1007/S00145-024-09513-6zbMATH Open1547.94317MaRDI QIDQ6617632FDOQ6617632
Authors: M. Bellare, Anna Lysyanskaya 
Publication date: 11 October 2024
Published in: Journal of Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
- Basing PRFs on Constant-Query Weak PRFs: Minimizing Assumptions for Efficient Symmetric Cryptography
- Beyond-birthday secure domain-preserving PRFs from a single permutation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207998
- PRF-ODH: relations, instantiations, and impossibility results
- How to build optimally secure PRFs using block ciphers
Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)
Cites Work
- A Pseudorandom Generator from any One-way Function
- Formalizing human ignorance
- High-speed high-security signatures
- How to Generate Cryptographically Strong Sequences of Pseudorandom Bits
- The Security of Triple Encryption and a Framework for Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs
- Keying hash functions for message authentication
- Number-theoretic constructions of efficient pseudo-random functions
- Pseudorandom functions and permutations provably secure against related-key attacks
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The exact PRF-security of NMAC and HMAC
- Pseudorandom functions and lattices
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Standard security does not imply security against selective-opening
- Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2005
- A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol
- New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: security without collision resistance
- Non-uniform cracks in the concrete: the power of free precomputation
- Hash-Function Based PRFs: AMAC and Its Multi-User Security
- Hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms and authenticated key exchange
- A new pseudorandom generator from collision-resistant hash functions
- Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard
- When messages are keys: is HMAC a dual-PRF?
This page was built for publication: Symmetric and dual PRFs from standard assumptions: a generic validation of a prevailing assumption
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6617632)
