Procurement contract design under asymmetric information of random yield
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Publication:6635993
DOI10.1142/S0217595923500161MaRDI QIDQ6635993FDOQ6635993
Authors: Qingkai Ji, Feng Liu, Jun Zhuang
Publication date: 12 November 2024
Published in: Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
- Optimal procurement strategy under supply risk
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- Two-part tariff contracting with competing unreliable suppliers in a supply chain under asymmetric information
- Achieving optimal performance of supply chain under cost information asymmetry
Stochastic programming (90C15) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
Cites Work
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Optimal Auction Design
- Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Backup Production Option
- Two-part tariff contracting with competing unreliable suppliers in a supply chain under asymmetric information
- A carrier-shipper contract under asymmetric information in the ocean transport industry
- The impacts of channel structure and information on an OEM's procurement strategy
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