Procurement contract design under asymmetric information of random yield

DOI10.1142/S0217595923500161MaRDI QIDQ6635993zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Qingkai Ji, Feng Liu, Jun Zhuang

Publication date 12 November 2024

Published in Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217595923500161

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationrandom yieldsupply chain contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Stochastic programming (90C15) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Optimal procurement strategy under supply risk
• Optimal pricing contracts and level of information asymmetry in a supply chain
• Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains
• Two-part tariff contracting with competing unreliable suppliers in a supply chain under asymmetric information
• Achieving optimal performance of supply chain under cost information asymmetry

Cites work

• A carrier-shipper contract under asymmetric information in the ocean transport industry
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Optimal Auction Design
• Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Backup Production Option
• The impacts of channel structure and information on an OEM's procurement strategy
• Two-part tariff contracting with competing unreliable suppliers in a supply chain under asymmetric information

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