Innovation adoption by forward-looking social learners

DOI10.3982/TE4455MaRDI QIDQ6664086FDOQ6664086

Authors: Mira Frick, Yuhta Ishii 

Publication date: 16 January 2025

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

innovation adoptionsocial learningstrategic experimentationexponential banditsinformational free-riding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation
• A new product growth for model consumer durables
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability
• Technical Change and the Rate of Imitation
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
• Biased social learning
• Uncertainty traps
• Learning and Capacity Expansion under Demand Uncertainty
• Learning and information aggregation in an exit game
• Breakdowns
• Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
• Recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning
• Learning dynamics in social networks
• Rushes in large timing games

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