Innovation adoption by forward-looking social learners

DOI10.3982/TE4455MaRDI QIDQ6664086zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mira Frick, Yuhta Ishii

Publication date 16 January 2025

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

innovation adoptionsocial learningstrategic experimentationexponential banditsinformational free-riding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• A new product growth for model consumer durables
• Adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability
• Biased social learning
• Breakdowns
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
• Learning and Capacity Expansion under Demand Uncertainty
• Learning and information aggregation in an exit game
• Learning dynamics in social networks
• Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• Recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning
• Rushes in large timing games
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
• Technical Change and the Rate of Imitation
• Uncertainty traps

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