Abstract: I address the problem of indefiniteness in quantum mechanics: the problem that the theory, without changes to its formalism, seems to predict that macroscopic quantities have no definite values. The Everett interpretation is often criticised along these lines and I shall argue that much of this criticism rests on a false dichotomy: that the macroworld must either be written directly into the formalism or be regarded as somehow illusory. By means of analogy with other areas of physics, I develop the view that the macroworld is instead to be understood in terms of certain structures and patterns which emerge from quantum theory (given appropriate dynamics, in particular decoherence). I extend this view to the observer, and in doing so make contact with functionalist theories of mind.
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Cited in
(41)- Making sense of Born's rule \(p_\alpha =\Vert \varPsi_\alpha \Vert^2\) with the many-minds interpretation
- Four tails problems for dynamical collapse theories
- Bohmian trajectories and the ether: where does the analogy fail?
- Measurement outcomes and probability in Everettian quantum mechanics
- Quantum probability and many worlds
- Probability in two deterministic universes
- Branches in the Everett interpretation
- Macroscopic reality from quantum complexity
- Everett and the Born rule
- Interpreting quantum mechanics according to a pragmatist approach
- Reduction and emergence in the fractional quantum Hall state
- Decoherence and its role in the modern measurement problem
- Solving the measurement problem: de Broglie-Bohm loses out to Everett
- Real world interpretations of quantum theory
- Can Everett be interpreted without extravaganza?
- Experimental motivation and empirical consistency in minimal no-collapse quantum mechanics
- Multiplicity in Eeverett's interpretation of quantum mechanics
- Spatial degrees of freedom in Everett quantum mechanics
- The problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation
- Watching the clocks: interpreting the Page-Wootters formalism and the internal quantum reference frame programme
- Dissolving the measurement problem is not an option for the realist
- What is a complex system?
- Many worlds, the cluster-state quantum computer, and the problem of the preferred basis
- Laws of nature as constraints
- Worlds in the Everett interpretation
- Understanding Deutsch's probability in a deterministic multiverse
- In defence of naiveté: the conceptual status of Lagrangian quantum field theory
- A model-theoretic interpretation of environment-induced superselection
- Introduction: Space-time and the wave function
- The status of our ordinary three dimensions in a quantum universe
- Whence deep realism for Everettian quantum mechanics?
- Causal decision theory and EPR correlations
- An introduction to many worlds in quantum computation
- Peculiarities of simulation of Everettian spaces
- An ontology of nature with local causality, parallel lives, and many relative worlds
- Tabletop experiments for quantum gravity are also tests of the interpretation of quantum mechanics
- A history of entanglement: decoherence and the interpretation problem
- Fine ways to fail to secure local realism
- Everett's ``many-worlds proposal
- Do we have any viable solution to the measurement problem?
- Is the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics \(\psi\)-ontic or \(\psi\)-epistemic?
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