Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.009MaRDI QIDQ765230zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philipp C. Wichardt

Publication date 19 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.009

zbMATH Keywords

existencebounded rationalityvaluation equilibriumimperfect recall

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302001 (Why is no real title available?)
• Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample
• Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• The absent-minded driver's paradox: Synthesis and responses

Cited in

(2)

• How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective
• Valuation equilibrium with clubs

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