Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109114MaRDI QIDQ777657zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Teis Lunde Lømo

Publication date 7 July 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109114

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionvertical relationssecret contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure
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• Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts
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Cites work

• Contracting with Externalities
• Double marginalization and cost pass-through: Weyl-Fabinger and Cowan meet Spengler and Bresnahan-Reiss
• On the welfare effects of vertical integration: opportunism vs. double marginalization
• Pass-through, vertical contracts, and bargains
• The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices

Cited in

(4)

• Friction in related-party trade when a rival is also a customer
• Optimal tariffs with uncertainty and downstream fixed costs
• Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure
• Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment

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