Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109114zbMATH Open1442.91045OpenAlexW3014873079MaRDI QIDQ777657FDOQ777657

Authors: Teis Lunde Lømo 

Publication date: 7 July 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109114

Recommendations

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• Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor
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zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionvertical relationssecret contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• Contracting with Externalities
• Double marginalization and cost pass-through: Weyl-Fabinger and Cowan meet Spengler and Bresnahan-Reiss
• The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices
• Pass-through, vertical contracts, and bargains
• On the welfare effects of vertical integration: opportunism vs. double marginalization

Cited In (4)

• Friction in related-party trade when a rival is also a customer
• Optimal tariffs with uncertainty and downstream fixed costs
• Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure
• Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment

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