Realism and empirical equivalence
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Publication:777948
DOI10.1007/S10992-019-09526-8zbMATH Open1484.03005OpenAlexW2970494909WikidataQ127324025 ScholiaQ127324025MaRDI QIDQ777948FDOQ777948
Publication date: 8 July 2020
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09526-8
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Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)
Cites Work
- Carnap and logical truth
- Every two elementarily equivalent models have isomorphic ultrapowers
- Computability and Logic
- Embeddability, syntax, and semantics in accounts of scientific theories
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Some remarks on the bearing of model theory on the theory of theories
- Glymour and Quine on theoretical equivalence
- The probabilistic no miracles argument
- Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist. Materials and perspectives
- The no miracles argument without the base rate fallacy
Cited In (8)
- Earman on underdetermination and empirical indistinguishability
- It is the theory which decides what we can observe
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- What is structural empiricism? Scientific change in an empiricist setting
- Actuality and quantification
- Everettian actualism
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