On the price of anarchy for high-price links

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Publication:777977

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_23zbMATH Open1435.91034arXiv1909.09799OpenAlexW2991245402MaRDI QIDQ777977FDOQ777977

Carme Àlvarez, Arnau Messegué

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Abstract: We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classic model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker in 2003. This is a selfish network creation model where players correspond to nodes in a network and each of them can create links to the other n1 players at a prefixed price alpha>0. The player's goal is to minimise the sum of her cost buying edges and her cost for using the resulting network. One of the main conjectures for this model states that the price of anarchy, i.e. the relative cost of the lack of coordination, is constant for all alpha. This conjecture has been confirmed for alpha=O(n1delta) with deltageq1/logn and for alpha>4n13. The best known upper bound on the price of anarchy for the remaining range is 2O(sqrtlogn). We give new insights into the structure of the Nash equilibria for alpha>n and we enlarge the range of the parameter alpha for which the price of anarchy is constant. Specifically, we prove that for any small epsilon>0, the price of anarchy is constant for alpha>n(1+epsilon) by showing that any biconnected component of any non-trivial Nash equilibrium, if it exists, has at most a constant number of nodes.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.09799





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