Aumann-Shapley prices as a Scarf social equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90151-0MaRDI QIDQ800808zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph Greenberg, Benyamin Shitovitz

Publication date 1984

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90151-0

zbMATH Keywords

coreincreasing returns to scaleassociated atomless gameAumann-Shapley pricesScarf Social Equilibriumsingle output

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164504
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Cites work

• Core and value for a public-goods economy: An example
• Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices

Cited in

(7)

• Distributive production sets and equilibria with increasing returns
• On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164504 (Why is no real title available?)
• Returns to size vs returns to scale: The core with production revisited
• Value allocation with economies of scale
• Game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale
• On market prices in linear production games

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