Aumann-Shapley prices as a Scarf social equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90151-0zbMATH Open0551.90008OpenAlexW1973466734MaRDI QIDQ800808FDOQ800808

Authors: Joseph Greenberg, Benyamin Shitovitz 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90151-0

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164504
• Value allocation with economies of scale
• Payoffs in Nonatomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach
• Core, value and equilibria for market games: On a problem of Aumann and Shapley
• Shared Facility Games with Variable Utilization

zbMATH Keywords

coreincreasing returns to scaleassociated atomless gameAumann-Shapley pricesScarf Social Equilibriumsingle output

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Demand Compatible Equitable Cost Sharing Prices
• Core and value for a public-goods economy: An example

Cited In (7)

• Distributive production sets and equilibria with increasing returns
• On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Returns to size vs returns to scale: The core with production revisited
• Value allocation with economies of scale
• Game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale
• On market prices in linear production games

This page was built for publication: Aumann-Shapley prices as a Scarf social equilibrium

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q800808)