Controllability in policy games: Policy neutrality and the theory of economic policy revisited
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Publication:857736
DOI10.1007/S10614-006-9035-5zbMATH Open1101.91002OpenAlexW2059430131MaRDI QIDQ857736FDOQ857736
Andrew Hughes Hallett, Nicola Acocella, G. Di Bartolomeo
Publication date: 20 December 2006
Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-006-9035-5
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Cites Work
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
- Computational aspects of the open-loop Nash equilibrium in linear quadratic games
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- Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters
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- Four Alternative Policies to Restore Balance of Payments Equilibrium
- Independent monetary policies and social equity
- Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: controllability in policy games
- The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters*
- How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?
Cited In (3)
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