Controllability in policy games: Policy neutrality and the theory of economic policy revisited
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Recommendations
- Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: controllability in policy games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3869008 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48309 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48313 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3244413 (Why is no real title available?)
- Computational aspects of the open-loop Nash equilibrium in linear quadratic games
- Four Alternative Policies to Restore Balance of Payments Equilibrium
- How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?
- Independent monetary policies and social equity
- Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
- The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters*
- Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: controllability in policy games
Cited in
(4)- Towards a new theory of economic policy: continuity and innovation
- Controllability and the theory of economic policy: a structural approach
- Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: controllability in policy games
- DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU
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