Controllability in policy games: Policy neutrality and the theory of economic policy revisited

DOI10.1007/s10614-006-9035-5zbMath1101.91002OpenAlexW2059430131MaRDI QIDQ857736

Andrew Hughes Hallett, G. Di Bartolomeo, Nicola Acocella

Publication date: 20 December 2006

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-006-9035-5

zbMATH Keywords

controllabilitypolicy effectivenessLQ-policy gamespolicy neutralityTinbergen system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (1)

Towards a New Theory of Economic Policy: Continuity and Innovation

Cites Work

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• How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?
• Four Alternative Policies to Restore Balance of Payments Equilibrium

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