Lottery rather than waiting-line auction

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0134-YzbMATH Open1138.91511OpenAlexW2097138921MaRDI QIDQ862544FDOQ862544

Authors: Winston T. H. Koh, Zhenlin Yang, Lijing Zhu 

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/204

Recommendations

• Ordinal allocation
• Efficient lottery design
• Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: structural model and empirical analysis
• Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
• Priority auctions and queue disciplines that depend on processing time

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• The Large-Sample Behavior of Transformations to Normality
• A Survey of the Theory of Rationing

Cited In (7)

• Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand
• Allocating scarce resources using a weighted lottery
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: structural model and empirical analysis
• Ordinal allocation
• How lotteries outperform auctions
• Lottery-rationed public access under alternative tariff arrangements: changes in quality, quantity, and expected utility

This page was built for publication: Lottery rather than waiting-line auction

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q862544)