Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information
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Publication:957862
DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0315-7zbMath1158.91008OpenAlexW2088214624MaRDI QIDQ957862
Publication date: 1 December 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0315-7
pure-strategy equilibriumgames with private and public informationmixed-startegy equilibriumstrong purification
Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (8)
Discontinuous stochastic games ⋮ Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash demand game ⋮ On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in games with private information: a complete characterization ⋮ On the diffuseness of incomplete information game ⋮ Existence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games: a sharpened necessity result ⋮ Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot ⋮ Purification and roulette wheels ⋮ On games with incomplete information and the Dvoretsky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem with countable partitions
Cites Work
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- Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces
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- Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information
- The Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem and purification in atomless finite-action games
- Purification of measure-valued maps
- Private Information and Pure-Strategy Equilibria
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
- Regular Conditional Expectations of Correspondences
- Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies
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