Calculating upper and lower probability bounds on the outcomes of large entry games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.02.006zbMATH Open1230.91009OpenAlexW2053723620MaRDI QIDQ985200FDOQ985200

Authors: J. Martínez 

Publication date: 20 July 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.006

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zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaNash equilibriumentry gamesmodified minimum distance estimators

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Identification and estimation of a discrete game of complete information
• Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria
• Empirical models of discrete games
• Estimation of quantity games in the presence of indivisibilities and heterogeneous firms
• Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry

Cited In (2)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Expectation of the largest bet size in the Labouchere system

Uses Software

• Gambit

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