Calculating upper and lower probability bounds on the outcomes of large entry games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.02.006MaRDI QIDQ985200zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Martínez

Publication date 20 July 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaNash equilibriumentry gamesmodified minimum distance estimators

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Nonparametric probability bounds for Nash equilibrium actions in a simultaneous discrete game
• Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games
• A geometric approach to inference in set-identified entry games
• Identification and estimation of a discrete game of complete information
• Estimation of finite sequential games

Cites work

• Empirical models of discrete games
• Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry
• Estimation of quantity games in the presence of indivisibilities and heterogeneous firms
• Identification and estimation of a discrete game of complete information
• Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria

Cited in

(2)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4139477 (Why is no real title available?)
• Expectation of the largest bet size in the Labouchere system

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Gambit

This page was built for publication: Calculating upper and lower probability bounds on the outcomes of large entry games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q985200)